Analytical support for information activities

Ministry of Defense (using the example of the annual collection

"Armed Forces of the Russian Federation")

Solving the problems of military development objectively presupposes the presence of sufficiently powerful support among broad sections of society for the actions of the Ministry of Defense. Recognizing this statement as an axiom, most military command and control bodies are now becoming more and more open in those issues that concern government authorities, public organizations and citizens in the field of defense and security of the country. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense understands that information activities will not automatically become modern and effective.

One of the ways that can really improve the quality of the military department’s information activities is the development of its analytical component. In fact, with the creation of the Expert Center and the Directorate of Information and Public Relations in the Office of the Minister of Defense, a fairly fruitful attempt was made to debug professional information and analytical activities. A significant result of this new type of activity was the release of the annual information and analytical collection “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Its first release took place in early 2006 and was entirely dedicated to the development of the Russian Armed Forces in 2005.

The Ministry of Defense understood that the publication of such a collection would give a new impetus to the military department’s relations with government bodies, public organizations, the media, the expert community and Russian citizens. It was assumed that the publication of a collection of information and analytical materials would contribute to:

· support by government agencies and society for the efforts of the Ministry of Defense undertaken to develop and implement state policy in the field of defense;

· dissemination in the country and abroad of objective and reliable information about the activities of the Armed Forces and the measures taken by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense for their further development;

· providing information on the progress of implementation of tasks determined by the top leadership of the state, and will also demonstrate changes in the leadership style of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Russia.

The achievement of the intended goals was preceded by preparatory work at the initial stage. Foreign experience in publishing “White Papers” was analyzed, in particular, the content of similar publications in the USA, Germany, and the Czech Republic was studied. In addition, specialists from the Ministry of Defense analyzed the results of monitoring the sphere of mass media and identified the most pressing issues of the life of the troops. Such issues for the vast majority of the country's citizens were: preparation of formations and military units to carry out their intended tasks, observance of law, order and discipline in the troops, recruitment of the Armed Forces, social security of military personnel, members of their families, as well as the implementation of decisions of the top leadership of the state.

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To study opinions and establish dialogue and feedback with key groups, invitations were sent to interested government, scientific and public organizations to comment on the contents of the future collection. The most useful for experts of the Ministry of Defense were the proposals of the Analytical Department of the Office of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow State Technical University. , Foundation for the Development of Political Centrism, Academy of Imageology.

Having collected and summarized the working materials, the experts began to develop a plan prospectus for an information and analytical collection and prepare instructions from one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation on involving the main and central departments of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the work. When the work plan for the future collection was formed, instructions on the preparation of relevant analytical materials were sent to military command bodies subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.

It should be immediately noted that not all central military authorities in mid-2005 understood the significance of this collection for the formation of a positive image of the Armed Forces. They had little idea of ​​the amount of analytical work that had to be done. The main difficulty, in our opinion, turned out to be psychological. That is, most experts working in the military command and control bodies at that time did not know (and could not know) in what style to present the requested material so that it would be interesting and understood by certain target groups of Russian society (those outside the army collectives) . Some texts were overloaded with technical details, were written briefly in military style and could only be understood by military specialists.

Another problem of a psychological nature was to explain to representatives of military command and control bodies the target setting of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense for this collection: there is no need to hide shortcomings, but it is necessary to show the public that the leadership of the Armed Forces, the command of formations and military units see ways to solve them and are taking certain steps measures to improve the situation. First of all, it was not easy to clarify this attitude for specialists in the field of military discipline and law and order, cultural and leisure work, representatives of the Navy, the Main Financial and Economic Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and those responsible for carrying out military-technical policy.

Responsible experts identified this problem in a timely manner and carried out additional work to overcome it. As a result, local attitudes towards the idea of ​​releasing a collection have changed. Many proposals began to be made regarding structure and content, and the amount of proposed working material was many times greater than what the experts required. At the same time, the experts were sympathetic to the desire of the performers to cover as much as possible their activities on a wide range of issues related to the activities of the central bodies of military command. At this moment, the main task of the Expert Center specialists was reduced to an analytical and even constructive-critical understanding of the presented materials, determining their place in accordance with the planned structure of the collection. To solve this problem, qualified experts were involved, including one doctor of science and eight candidates of science.

Materials from the country's leading sociological centers on army issues, such as the Public Opinion Foundation, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the Romir Monitoring agency, and the Levada Center, were studied. But the sociological basis of the collection was the analytical materials of the Sociological Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which, as is known, functions by decision of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Center monthly monitors the main problems of the Russian Armed Forces in districts (fleets), military garrisons, military units and military commissariats among military personnel and citizens in the reserve.

Currently, the sociological knowledge obtained by the Sociological Center of the Armed Forces and influential Russian sociological centers is used by a small number of military authorities and military specialists when organizing public relations. At the same time, without scientifically based sociological support of the Ministry of Defense’s relations with the public, it is difficult to make an informed and correct decision on managing the information support process and count on achieving the expected results. Social expectations of citizens and public opinion in the Russian Federation about military service, about the actual state and development trends of the Armed Forces significantly influence the military sphere of public life as a whole and the processes taking place in it. Obviously, positive public opinion makes it possible to find the required number of volunteers for contract service, prevents citizens from evading conscription into the Armed Forces, etc.

At the initial stage of structuring the information, the resulting material for the collection was brought into a form that simplifies its further processing. To do this, it was necessary to answer a number of questions:

to what extent the selected material corresponded to the strategy of the intended collection;

how relevant the materials are today for citizens of the Russian Federation and for the military authorities themselves;

whether the prepared working materials comply with the requirements for the protection of state secrets.

To solve the main problems, specific methodological approaches were used, which were considered as independent analytical systems and contained statistical, logical, expert, linguistic and conceptual analysis. Such a variety of analytical systems was by no means accidental, since each of them has its own strengths and weaknesses and does not allow separately to provide Ministry of Defense experts with reliable information about the integrity and depth of ongoing processes in the Russian armed forces.

At the same time, it must be admitted that in the process of studying the presented material, Ministry of Defense specialists often had different opinions not only on the form of presentation, but also on its structure and content of the material. An important role in resolving existing contradictions was played by methods of activating thinking, as programmers say, “getting out of the problem and entering again” after some time.

The use of the method of collective generation of ideas (brainstorming and brainstorming and a number of others) made it possible to:

· make a transition from an emotional perception of the presented materials (since most of the experts of the Expert Center previously served in the troops and various military command and control bodies) to an abstract-logical one;

· move on to constructive intellectual procedures up to rethinking a particular problem and almost completely reworking some of the presented materials;

· begin to generate ways to solve problems characteristic of certain military structures and military command and control bodies.

The result of the analytical work was a draft information and analytical collection, which was a fundamentally new information product. At this stage, additional experts were brought in who were not previously familiar with the initial materials presented. Their task was to evaluate the information product and its compliance with the idea of ​​the collection. The task turned out to be quite difficult, primarily because, apart from military journalists, the educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense do not train specialists in preparing various texts for non-military audiences. Therefore, a limited circle of the most trained specialists was involved in its implementation, and not so much specialists in the field of military affairs, but, first of all, political scientists, philosophers, sociologists, lawyers, and philologists.

To achieve their goals, specialists had to analyze the material as a whole, that is, read it repeatedly “from cover to cover.” The work required maximum attention and the ability to determine mutual correspondence between sections based on objective criteria. I must admit, given the time parameters, this was not so easy to do.

Due to the fact that the collection is planned to be published annually based on the results of the past year, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to include in the structure of the collection reports of the President of the Russian Federation and the Minister of Defense at the annual meeting of the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Filling the contents of the collection with images of the main types of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and reference materials gave the publication a “living” character. In our opinion, information about the location of military command and control bodies, military educational institutions and their contact numbers helps representatives of target groups to navigate when resolving emerging issues.

The opinions received by the Ministry of Defense from MSTU, the Russian Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation after the release of the first issue of the collection in 2006 convinced specialists of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation that the direction of focusing the main efforts of information support was chosen correctly.

Specialists received practice in analytical work with materials from the main and central military command and control bodies. We have gained extensive experience in building relationships with target groups and the military command and control bodies themselves. It must be admitted that during the work certain shortcomings were identified that specialists need to work on purposefully.

In May 2007, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General, held the second presentation of the information and analytical collection “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 2006”. According to him, “Russian society shows great interest in the activities of the Armed Forces... . In the opinion of the Ministry of Defense, it is very important that Russian society can receive information, as they say, first-hand.”

Summing up the work done over two years, we can say that the idea of ​​preparing and publishing an annual information and analytical collection has justified itself. The circulation of the collection in 2007 increased 3.5 times and amounted to 7 thousand copies. This indirectly confirms that high-quality analytical support for information activities brings results.

Of course, the given example of work on the collection needs further understanding. At the same time, the author draws attention to the fact that such an approach to performing information tasks should be systematic. Creating an analytical support system is a complex interdisciplinary task that requires the collaboration of specialists from various fields. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is making significant efforts to form such a system, realizing that the moral, physical and material costs will justify expectations.

In conclusion, we will outline a number of issues that require further organizational and analytical study.

The Russian Ministry of Defense understands that a public discussion of the contents of the collections among target groups of Russian society has not yet taken place. At the same time, there is an objective need to develop feedback. Specialists who are directly involved in the work on its release look forward to such a discussion in the future. The opinion of such a target group as the officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation also needs to be studied.

In foreign armies, such publications are posted on the official websites of military departments. There is an opinion about the advisability of posting the information and analytical collection “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” on the official website of the Ministry of Defense. In the future, in order to reach a wider range of the public, it is necessary to consider the possibility of releasing the collection on compact discs in various formats.

The Expert Center takes into account that in terms of the quality of design, capacity and circulation, the collection is not accessible to the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation. There is an opinion about the need to publish an information collection taking into account the regional specifics of the Russian Federation (maybe by reducing costs, making it more accessible).

There is no doubt that the role of analytical support for information activities of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation will increase with each release of the collection.

Alexander Petrunin

For example, see: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 2005. – M.: RIC of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2006. – P. 13-14.

An information product is the result of performing certain actions on data, leading to the receipt of a new array of data for the purpose of their further processing and interpretation.

See: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 2006. – M.: Voeninform, 2007.

See, for more details: O. Falichev. Army priorities // Military-industrial courier. – 2007. – No. 18. – P. 4.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 7/2008, pp. 42-45

D. P. PRUDNIKOV

PRUDNIKOV Dmitry Petrovich was born on August 1, 1974. He served in the Moscow Military District. In 2001, he graduated with honors from the Faculty of Culture and Journalism of the Military University of the Russian Defense Ministry. He served in various positions in the North Caucasus and Moscow military districts. Since 2005 - adjunct at the Department of Political Science of the Military University of the Russian Defense Ministry. In 2007, he was dismissed from the RF Armed Forces from the position of senior editor of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper in connection with his transfer to service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Currently, he is a senior inspector for special assignments of the Directorate for Organization of Work with Personnel of the Personnel Management Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

NEW information technologies and the global informatization unfolding in the world are opening up unprecedented opportunities in all spheres of human activity. It is becoming more and more obvious that social progress and the development of each person are accompanied and even largely determined by the development of the information sphere. The “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” states that its implementation is also achieved through information measures aimed at ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. In other words, information acts simultaneously as its goal, resource and means. In this regard, the role of information support in military-administrative activities is constantly increasing.

Information support for military command and control is a set of information resources, tools and technologies at the disposal of command and control bodies and their officials, as well as activities aimed at their creation, improvement and ensuring their uninterrupted functioning. The main goal of information support for military command and control is to increase the stability of management of the military organization of the state, its Armed Forces in the conditions of information influence from the enemy. This goal is achieved through a set of diverse measures.

So, specific areas of functioning of the information support system areas of defense are: identifying information threats and their sources, identifying practical tasks to neutralize them; development of special software, application programs and information security tools in automated control systems for military purposes; improving the means of protecting information from unauthorized access, developing secure communication systems and command and control of troops and weapons; improving the structure of functional bodies of the defense information support system and coordinating their interaction; improving techniques and methods of strategic and operational camouflage, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, etc.

However, in general, information support for military-administrative activities is not a purely operational-tactical or technological task. In terms of its goals, content, and results, it also relates to the sphere of politics, which is clearly visible when identifying the components of information support for military command and control. In addition to the specific areas mentioned above, it includes:

equal entry of the country into the global information space, including the inclusion of its information resources in global information and telecommunication networks;

bringing to the Russian and international public reliable information about the military policy of the Russian Federation, its official position on current military-political problems;

creation and improvement of information infrastructure, its technical and software development;

development of modern information technologies, the domestic information industry, including the industry of information technology, telecommunications and communications, meeting the needs of the domestic market with its products and the entry of these products into the world market;

development and implementation of information technologies for command and control of troops and weapons and information systems for weapons and military equipment, automated systems for military purposes, as well as control systems for them;

protecting information resources from unauthorized access, ensuring the security of information and telecommunication systems on Russian territory, maintaining state and military secrets, strengthening control over the use of information in organizations engaged in military activities;

ensuring the accumulation, preservation and effective use of domestic information resources, preserving and strengthening the moral values ​​of society, traditions of patriotism and humanism, the cultural and scientific potential of the country;

active counteraction to information, propaganda and psychological operations of a potential enemy, weakening (undermining) its information capabilities;

conducting special propaganda against the population and troops of the enemy and neutral countries in order to form an opinion in them that is beneficial for the influencing party;

training of qualified specialists in information-technical and information-psychological warfare;

collection, processing and promotion of objective information necessary to assess the situation and make a decision, bringing to the executors the information necessary for their organization and mobilization, dissemination of information that provides understanding and support for the decision made.

Information support includes two flows of information, from the military manager and to the military manager. Thus, information support should provide the commander with material that allows him to recreate the true picture of the situation in which he will have to act. At the same time, the work of commanders and staffs is defined as an analysis and assessment of the situation, which in turn represents the process of studying all the factors and conditions affecting the implementation of tasks and the achievement of the goal. This work is carried out continuously as relevant information becomes available. Methodologically, it consists in consistently identifying, comprehending and determining the role of all elements of the situation that can influence the development of the situation. Depending on the level of control, an assessment of the military-political (or socio-political, when it comes to the situation within the country), strategic, operational or tactical situation is carried out. For example, for military managers at the operational-tactical level the subject of analysis are:

composition, condition and security of subordinate units and subunits, their combat capabilities, operational position, state of the command and control system, strengths and weaknesses, readiness for action, as well as the position and capabilities of neighbors and troops (forces) solving problems in the interests of the association (formation, parts);

economic and social conditions, socio-political and socio-psychological situation, state of military-civil relations in the area of ​​location and activity of the formation, unit; the nature and level of interaction with local authorities and self-government; ethnodemographic and religious situation in the region; the degree of socio-political differentiation of society, the positions of its various constituent social groups and the relationships between them; the direction and nature of the actions of the media; the presence of social movements and extremist organizations, illegal armed groups; the possibility of terrorist actions;

combat strength, operational position, combat effectiveness and morale of enemy troops (forces), command and control system and logistics support, strengths and weaknesses, intentions and possible nature of actions, the most important objects (targets) and their coordinates, as well as characteristics of new means of armed struggle and methods of conducting combat operations (combat);

natural-geographical, including climatic, conditions, operational equipment of the territory.

Analysis and assessment of the military-political and socio-political situation are carried out from certain positions. Identification of cause-and-effect relationships between its constituent elements is aimed at identifying measures to neutralize its unfavorable factors and effectively use positive factors. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the assessment of the parties does not take into account their real strengths, but the ideas about them that have developed on the basis of available information. These ideas are not always adequate to reality. The difficulty lies in the fact that when studying the situation, the declared goals and statements of the forces and structures influencing its state, and their practical actions can diverge significantly, both as a consequence of their initial desire to hide their true intentions, and due to a change in position under the pressure of circumstances . In this regard, to assess the situation, the study of the socio-psychological qualities and nature of the previous activities of decision makers (commanders of the opposing side, heads of institutions and organizations, opinion leaders, etc.) is of great importance.

All information must meet the following requirements: completeness and comprehensiveness, reliability, timeliness and efficiency. The optimal solution presupposes comprehensive information about all circumstances that influence (can influence) the objects and the course of events that are targeted by the administrative activities of military command and control bodies. Associated with this is the presence of a number of objective contradictions in the formation of the information field.

Firstly, The reliability of information is ensured by its double-checking, which takes time and, consequently, leads to a delay in information and reduces its efficiency. Conversely, efficiency can cause insufficient reliability of information.

Secondly, completeness of information presupposes the presence of all knowledge about everything, which is in principle impossible. Meanwhile, a very large amount of information is difficult to process. Therefore, excess or excessive detail of information, as well as its lack, make it difficult to assess the situation.

Third, the presence of many and different sources of information can cause, on the one hand, the repetition of information, and on the other, its incomparability.

And finally fourthly, certain difficulties are associated with the aggravation of contradictions noted in the “Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation” between the needs of society to expand the free exchange of information and the need to maintain certain regulated restrictions on its dissemination.

Another direction of information support is from the military manager. It is intended to justify his decisions, that is, to explain and justify them as necessary, appropriate and feasible. Any decision should be as legitimate as possible.

This information goes to three addresses: to subordinates (there are special structures for this, including educational bodies); to the public (this is done by public relations agencies); on the enemy (special services do this). Of course, the content, volume, nature of information and the method of its promotion are fundamentally different in each case.

Thus, information support is an essential component of military management activities and is mainly the provision of the necessary information to military managers, which as a result gives them the opportunity to adequately and more effectively use military force. At the same time, information support is aimed at creating the necessary conditions and a favorable information environment for military-administrative activities. Such activities are carried out to a greater extent through the dissemination of information among citizens of the state, personnel of the armed forces and the world community.

See: Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation.

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Colonel A. Skantsev

The article discusses issues related to the current state of affairs regarding the automation of the control system (ACS) of the armed forces, and in particular such aspects as: the main ACS used in the control system of the aircraft; documents of the regulatory framework on automation of the control system of the US Armed Forces; information about the Department of Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

The relevance of the materials presented in the article is determined by the changes that occurred in this area in 2013-2014.

According to the views of the American leadership, since the end of the 20th century, humanity has entered a new “information” stage of its development. Proof of this is mass computerization, the rapid development of information technologies (IT), communications and telecommunications. These circumstances decisively changed the possibilities of human intellectual activity and caused the need to reassess and develop the views established in military theory and practice.

ACS is understood as part of the troop (force) control system, which is an organizational and technical complex in accordance with the types of support, designed to increase the efficiency of control by automating basic processes, such as collecting, processing, assessing and displaying data on the situation, the state of one’s troops and enemy troops; promptly notifying management of possible aggression; information and mathematical support for decision making; communicating orders (commands, instructions) to troops (forces); collecting reports on the receipt of orders (commands) and their implementation; registration and transmission of combat and reporting and information documents.

In accordance with the terminology adopted in the US Armed Forces, an automated troop control system is understood as an interconnected set of information processing, communication and data transmission tools connected to a local computer network (LAN), providing automation of the processes of collecting, analyzing and assessing situational data, supporting decision-making, planning, setting and communicating tasks to troops (forces) in real time, as well as monitoring their implementation.

Structurally, these systems are a set of hardware and software connected to a local network (automated workstations for officials based on personal computers, communication and data transmission equipment, location determination tools, server and network equipment, sets of general and special software), located at command posts of formations, units and subunits, military equipment for various purposes, as well as included in the equipment of individual military personnel.

Below are the main automated control systems that are used in the armed forces command and control system.

1. Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Officially launched on August 30, 1996, GCCS is the US military's automated command and control system that links the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CHS), and the commanders of the US armed forces. Designed to provide operational control of armed forces in an automated mode, it is a complex of hardware and software that uses general standards, regulations and procedures in its work. The automated control system is capable of interacting with numerous applications and interfaces that constitute “operational architectures” and provide communication with all geographically distributed components of this system in all warfare environments at the tactical, operational and strategic command levels.

GCCS supports six management processes, operations management; mobilization; deployment of groups; personnel, logistics and technical support; intelligence.

This automated control system has eight functional subsystems: threat identification and assessment; assistance in strategic planning; forecasting the development of the situation; planning tasks; preparation and communication of executive instructions (implementation of plans); monitoring the situation; risk analysis; general geoinformation picture of the situation.

This automated control system includes the following structural components:
- global command and control system (GCCS) of the ground forces (Global Command and Control System -Army) (hereinafter - GCCS-A);
- GSOU Air Force (Global Command and Control System-Air Force) (hereinafter - GCCS-AF);
- GSOU naval forces and coast guard (Global Command and Control System - Navy) (hereinafter - GCCS-N);
- GSOU Marine Corps (KMP - Global Command and Control System - Marine Corps).

2. Global Combat Support System - Joint (GCSS-J); GCSS-J is an automated control system that includes subsystems identical in structure to directorates (departments) of headquarters at various levels of management: logistics (material supply); transport; medical; legal (legal); religious; financial; military music; personnel service; ordnance disposal (hazardous materials) services.

GCSS-J, commissioned in September 2011, is an automated control system that uses a service-oriented architecture to solve logistics problems for the US Armed Forces. For these purposes, this system provides information on defining: support tasks; volumes and range of material resources required to perform tasks at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of management; information necessary for use by command and control, in terms of comprehensive support; situational awareness in the field of planning, execution, control and evaluation of logistics operations across the entire spectrum of operations of troops (forces) both in peacetime and wartime.

This system allows you to generate reports on types of support in the form of reports on a geoinformation basis in a short time, and also guarantees information support for making decisions on combat support of troops (forces). It consists of automated control systems that automate the activities of the combat support structural units of the US Armed Forces, integrated into the GCCS (for example, the Transportation Coordinator Automated Movement Server) and others.

3. Multinational Information Sharing System (MNIS). Commissioned in the first quarter of 2013, this automated control system is designed to organize and implement the exchange of information between the GCCS and the control systems of the armed forces of partner states for the purpose of information support for the planning and conduct of multinational military operations. The MNIS includes: - Combined Federated Battle Logistics Network (CFBLNet), which is a system of test benches and laboratories for research and testing of the compatibility of automated control systems of countries participating in multinational coalitions, NATO members and, if necessary, other states.

Combined Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) is a digital information environment that is a combination of network applications and services that allow the exchange of information and databases, while ensuring information security.

CENTRIXS round-the-clock support system (Centrixs Surge Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Support), as well as software products provided for the development of CENTRIXS.

The Pegasus/Griffin information resource allows for the joint use of national and supranational automated control systems for transmitting classified information over communication channels.

Internet service UISS-APAN, which combines the advantages of unstructured access to information (blogs, forums) and structured collaboration (file sharing, calendars).

4. Joint Planning and Execution Services (J PES). Commissioned in the first quarter of 2013, JPES is intended for information support of military operations using IT for automated processing of situation data, presentation of information according to the existing reporting system, planning, execution and control.

It consists of a number of subsystems: reporting, planning, execution, monitoring, as well as tools: editing, quick query, management, permission.

The system is designed to ensure that all participants in the planning and conduct of military operations use the same dictionaries, procedures and databases.

In addition, there are a significant number of automated control systems that automate the activities of headquarters, troops (forces) on a territorial or functional basis (for example, in a separate operational direction or on logistics issues, etc.).

These are GCCS-compatible automated control systems such as:
- a global operational management system combined with an integrated imagery and reconnaissance system (Global Command and Control System-Joint Integrated Imagery and Intelligence);
- automated system for processing and analyzing intelligence information (All-Source Analysis System);
- a system for forming a unified picture of the operational situation (Common Operational Picture);
- automated logistics support management system for the Army (Battle Command Sustainment Support System);
- system of automated traffic coordination (Transportation Coordinator Automated Movement Server);
- automated control system of the Army Corps of Ground Forces (Army Tactical Command and Control System);
- automated control system for the brigade and below (Force XXI Battle Command - Brigade and below);
- automated military police information system (Military Police Management Information System);
- integrated information transmission network of the Ministry of Defense (Defense Information Systems Network);
- Joint Data Network and others.

These automated control systems characterize the modern look of equipping the US Armed Forces with control automation equipment. The strength of these systems is that on their basis a unified information and control environment is created in the country’s armed forces, which allows for:
- collection, storage and analysis of information about the actions of external and internal factors on troops (forces), as well as a forecast of their development;
- collection, storage, analysis and presentation in the necessary forms of information about the state and capabilities of its control system, subordinate and interacting systems;
- preparation of solution options, their formalization, formation of control actions and bringing them to control objects.

Existing military-grade AS (VN) will in the future be replaced by other, more advanced ones. Among the long-term solutions, the idea of ​​​​creating a unified automated system for the US Armed Forces as a result of the evolutionary development of GCCS is being explored. At the same time, the possibility of developing a revolutionary automated control system based on a new element base and breakthrough information and telecommunications technologies cannot be ruled out.

In the process of improving the automated control system of the US Armed Forces, examples of failures were noted. Thus, in the 2000s, an attempt was made to develop and implement a new NECC (Net Enabled Command Capability) control system to replace GCCS. However, this area of ​​work to improve the HV AS was considered inappropriate, and in 2009 it was discontinued.

All of the above automated control systems belong to the family of systems integrated with GCCS. Military command and control bodies, troops (forces) use these systems in a complex (in one unified command - OK - several systems can be used) in accordance with the decision of the OK on the organization of command. The composition and nature of the use of these VN systems are determined by the type of armed forces in which they are used (ground forces, navy or air force, marines or coast guard). All stages of the life cycle of these automated control systems are regulated by documents of the regulatory framework on the automation of the control system of the US Armed Forces.

Basic documents of the regulatory framework on automation of the control system of the US Armed Forces. Such documents on control system automation include the following:
- “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. Priorities for XXI (st) Century Defense.”
- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.
- “Strategic Plan for the development of a special information support agency (Ministry of Defense) for 2014-2019” (Strategic Plan D1SA 2014-2019).
In furtherance of these documents, manuals, orders, instructions, circulars, etc. are constantly being developed and published to clarify and develop their content.

These documents reflect the views of the American command on:
- the main functions of the automated control system of the US Armed Forces, in particular: command and control of troops (forces), provision of situational data, formation in the future of a unified information and intelligence space (UIS);
- prospects for the development of automated control systems;
- principles of military service by personnel of the American armed forces, etc.;
- principles of comprehensive support for the US Armed Forces.

One of the areas for implementing the provisions of the governing documents, as they relate to the EIRP in the US Armed Forces, is the development of automated control systems through the introduction of promising information and telecommunication technologies. This provides an information advantage when operating in various environments: on land, on and under the sea surface, in the air and space, in cyber space. Thus, conditions are created for achieving overwhelming superiority and winning victory over the enemy.

So, in the US Armed Forces there is a developed system of regulatory documents on automation of the control system. As a rule, they disclose the purpose, tasks to be solved, components, operating procedures, requirements for ensuring information security, as well as other important (current) problems.

As for the US Armed Forces, an organizational structure has been created to solve this problem, the main components of which are:
- Department of Information Systems of the US Department of Defense;
- global operational management system (Global Command and Control System);
- Multinational information sharing system;
- Global Combat Support System - Joint;
- system of joint planning and execution (Joint Planning and Execution Services);
- GCCS-integrated automated control systems.

The system organizer of activities to create and develop a unified information and control environment for the US Armed Forces, including those related to the creation and development of automated control systems, is the Information Systems Directorate of the US Department of Defense.

The UIS, created on June 25, 1991, is intended for:
- formation of the EIRP in the US Armed Forces;
- achieving and maintaining information superiority by collecting, processing and disseminating a continuous flow of information to interested users;
- creation of information space infrastructure.

The unified information space in the US Armed Forces means comprehensive information (databases, knowledge, etc.), consisting of standardized (classifiers, dictionaries, reference books, etc.), centralized (orders, instructions, signals, etc.) .) and updated (reports, reports, information, reporting materials, etc.) information located in an automated technological infrastructure, which includes: technical (servers, data centers, PCs, etc.) and software (general and special programs, etc.) products.

Currently, the penal system staff includes more than 14 thousand people working in 90 countries around the world. The agency's budget in 2014 amounted to more than $8 billion.
The UIS has identified the following most promising technologies that need to be developed in order to improve the automated control system:
- high-performance optical network technologies with speeds of 100 Gbit/s and higher;
- fault-tolerant network technologies that can withstand both natural environmental threats and cyber attacks;
- "cloud technologies;
- technologies for massively parallel processing of large volumes of data;
- control technologies;
- mobile technologies.

To search for and implement new ideas in the field of control automation, the Pentagon continues to actively involve other ministries and departments, representatives of the civil scientific and technical community and commercial structures of the country in cooperation. For these purposes, the UIS maintains Internet resources (for example, Forge.mil) designed to attract on a commercial basis various interested parties and structures in US Armed Forces projects using the technical capabilities of the military department. In the future, the department plans to expand the use of Internet resources, including through integration with similar civilian resources (in particular, with GitHub.com).

It follows that the UIS is the main organization dealing with the automation of the control system of the US Armed Forces.

Thus, the American leadership pays serious attention to the tasks of automating the control of the armed forces. Key areas of activity to automate the control system of the US Armed Forces are regulated in detail by the regulatory framework. These documents reflect the main views of the command on the automation of the control system that existed in the 2000s and in 2013-2014, as well as on the prospect of automation of the control system for the period until 2020.

The main views on control system automation, which existed from 2000 to 2013, were formulated in 2000. According to Western experts, this will allow:
- preserve the radio frequency spectrum used by the US Armed Forces automated control system;
- provide information to relevant officials;
- increase the efficiency and security of wireless communication networks;
- provide automated control systems services in the fight against terrorism, in combat conditions, as well as in critical environmental conditions;
- improving the quality of automated control system services. The main views on the same processes, formulated in 2014, boil down to the need:
- formation of an information and control environment in conditions of war and peace;
- providing information for military operations in remote theaters of war in the Central Asian region (particular attention is paid to the development of televideo conferencing in a secure mode);
- coordinating plans and working with other departments that form the information and management environment in the United States and abroad in the interests of the national armed forces;
- Ensuring information superiority over any enemy in terms of answering questions: what, where and when.

In order to implement these tasks, three directions for the development of automated control systems are presented:
- building an independent infrastructure;
- development of subsystems for management, control and information exchange of automated control systems;
- reliable operation and full provision of automated control systems.

Eight mechanisms for implementing the specified development plan have been developed: acquisition; contracts; mechanical engineering; information and knowledge management; People; planning; resources; radio frequency spectrum.

The main views of the American leadership on the prospect of automation of the control system for the period until 2020 were formulated in 2014:
- development of a formed information and management environment;
- consolidating the leading position of the US nuclear forces control system in comparison with similar systems of other countries;
- development of the concept of using automated control systems for managing cyber operations;
- increasing the speed of the automated control system;
- global defense against destructive elements;
- development of “cloud” technologies in the interests of the US Armed Forces;
- improvement of mobile technologies in the interests of the armed forces.

The solution to these tasks is entrusted to DISA, which provides the information needs on military issues of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff, commanders of the US Armed Forces, as well as other users of the country's Defense Information System.

The US military has a well-structured, extensive network of automated control systems, including both GCCS and GCCS-compatible automated systems.

At the same time, it is obvious that the weakness of the considered automated control systems is their diversity, duplication of functions, and difficulty of use by consumers.

The country's leadership is taking steps to create a single unified automated control system that will allow achieving information superiority over the enemy in compliance with modern requirements for these systems. The tendency to improve the quality of management through the introduction of more advanced technical, software, information, linguistic, organizational and other solutions can be considered as constant.

Hybrid methods of conducting modern wars make it extremely important to ensure the information security of the Russian armed forces. A hot war, which involves direct military clashes, is being replaced by a hybrid war, whose main goal is the development of civil wars and the creation of controlled information chaos on enemy territory. For this purpose, all possibilities are used - from hacker attacks on the most important life support systems of the state to the targeted work of the media.

The creation of a global space has significantly increased the threat of the use of information measures by a strategic enemy or global terrorism, both during the deployment of individual military-political operations and for the development of their strategic potential as a whole.

Protection from threats of this nature is required both by the armed forces themselves and their personnel, with whom work with hybrid warfare is carried out in the first place.

The value of information also increases. The degree of its protection from criminal attacks is becoming increasingly higher, and the opportunities for obtaining it are increasing. The ability to properly manage information arrays and their use is becoming the most important task facing military personnel.

A DLP system helps manage data in an organization’s information system. responds to non-compliance with security policies - rules for the processing and use of confidential information.

Typical threats and their origins

Information security of the armed forces as the most important state institution is also a guarantee of the security of the state itself. Protecting military information resources should be a priority for security professionals. To neutralize threats in the best way, it is necessary to identify them and classify them by origin, nature of impact, and degree of danger. Experts divide the types of threat sources into two groups:

• internal;
• external.

Sometimes you can find both external and internal sources of threats in one phenomenon. This may occur when targeted influence, originating from an external source, is transmitted through operators located in the country. Today, such units have at their disposal serious electronic means of disseminating information flows; sometimes they involve both professional hackers and volunteers from among Russian citizens.

Internal threat sources

One of the main sources of information threats is tension or destabilization of the socio-political situation in the locations of the armed forces. Creating an artificially tense atmosphere, provoking conflicts between personnel and the local population, sometimes even unrest caused by targeted information influence, become serious threats to the stability of the situation in the military unit and in the troops as a whole. Such situations have occurred and are occurring in the Caucasus, at Russian bases located in the CIS countries, and in other regions. They can only be resisted by carrying out targeted psychological and educational work with personnel, with parallel contact with regional authorities in order to prevent the provocative work of the media and other sources of dissemination of information attacks.

An important threat is the directed impact on the morale of troops by falsifying the facts of military history, increasing social tension, and an attempt to involve personnel in the development of political conflicts. The culprit of such information threats is most often the media, aimed at creating a tense situation. In some cases, even contacts of personnel with representatives of the press can become a means of special treatment, which will lead to a possible loss of morale.

Sometimes measures of such influence achieve not only psychological breakdowns that lead to military crimes or desertion, but also the creation of groups within the troops with the goal of deliberately undermining the country's defense capability. The spread of radical Islamism can also become a serious threat to the information security of the army. A soldier who has undergone special psychological treatment no longer considers himself a member of the army, but a religious community, and follows not the orders of the command, but the advice of his teachers. Such a fighter becomes a serious threat to the information security of military units, especially those located in regions with a predominantly Muslim population.

It is important to draw up current threats. For example, KIB SearchInform can be configured to search correspondence, documents and browser history for keywords indicating the interest of certain employees in extremism and terrorism.

Technical threats of an information nature concern both the operation of information systems used by troops, including command and control systems, and the safety of confidential information transmitted through military communications channels. Types of technical threats to the activities of the Armed Forces can be of a different nature: from intentional damage to systems and theft of information to the negligence of individual employees. Protection measures in this case will include increasing the level of security of automated control systems and training personnel in the necessary requirements related to information security. Security standards are determined by GOSTs and other methods developed and approved at the state level, but often in practice there is a delay in the implementation of new software and hardware that can counter threats from the enemy. Such a delay is due to the peculiarities of the functioning of the government procurement system and in itself becomes a security threat.

This type of attack can also include intentional damage to equipment and communication lines, sometimes resulting from the fault of personnel, the fault of the local population, and as a result of targeted enemy activity. Failure of a warship's life support systems, whether caused by negligence or planned attacks, can result in the death of the crew. Control over the safety of military equipment is one of the most important tasks facing responsible military personnel. Problems with information systems at space forces or nuclear facilities can be especially serious. Violation of spacecraft control systems due to ineffective code embedded in a software product often leads not only to financial losses, but also to a violation of the integrity of the country's security system. According to one of the versions expressed at the state commission, the collapse of the Phobos-Grunt apparatus was caused precisely by an intrusion into the control systems.

The threat of introducing false information into systems for tracking a possible attack is also becoming extremely important. The risk of air defense systems triggering false information intentionally sent by the enemy remains. Imaginary threats in the past almost led to the outbreak of nuclear war; now this risk has been reduced, but it remains.

A serious problem today is the insufficient development of the regulatory framework regarding the protection of information and work with new threats. A large number of phenomena in the information space have not yet been classified and reflected in regulations, which makes it difficult to apply liability measures for the implementation of any actions or organization of activities that may damage the information security of the armed forces and military personnel. But these areas are developing, and regulations are being adopted that legally regulate the admissibility of using certain foreign-made equipment, such as chips, in equipment supplied to the troops. The Russian Information Security Doctrine, adopted this year, assessed and described all possible types of threats, and now new regulations developed by the government are being created on its basis.

External threats

External sources of threats include those whose location is outside the territory of Russia or its allies. This type of threat is diverse; new measures of information and psychological influence on personnel are developed and used by the enemy regularly. At the same time, the use of new types of information weapons is becoming a fairly real threat, some of which are aimed at disabling information systems, and some at direct psychological impact on personnel. Moreover, the mechanism of action of such weapons, according to analysts, is based on the use of ultrasound, electromagnetic fields, and microwaves of various types. It is also possible to use medical and chemical agents that will help purposefully influence the behavior of military personnel in peacetime and combat situations. Such means of conducting psychological operations can be used in those places where the Russian armed forces are involved in ongoing conflicts. The press names a large number of types of psychological weapons, but so far there is no official confirmation of their use.

It is no secret that the armed forces of a strategic enemy or global terrorist organizations have special units for information and psychological influence. Their activities are studied at the level of specialized research institutes, and measures to combat new threats are developed and actively put into practice.

Often, the use of targeted information impact is carefully prepared in advance by the work of the media. Military personnel are required to be able to classify and identify such threats, for which it is necessary to conduct appropriate training.

Social networks are becoming a serious security problem, with the help of which military personnel can accidentally give out important information. One of the main tasks to protect the security of the state should be the identification of such threats and their timely elimination.

- module “KIB SearchInform”, which monitors correspondence on social networks and instant messengers.

Information security measures

Measures that can be applied to protect information and ensure security are also divided into two groups:

• protection of information systems from damage and information from leakage and interception;
• protection of the psyche of personnel from intentional information and psychological influence.

These measures must be taken together, based on all the latest scientific developments and software products.

First group of measures:

• protection of troop deployment facilities and automated control systems and computer equipment located in them from fire damage or other intentional disablement;
• protecting systems from remote penetration by the enemy, in particular with the installation of software products that provide complete protection of the perimeter from penetration, for example, DLP systems and SIEM systems;
• protection of information of the nature of state or military secrets from leaks or intentional theft;
• electronic defense;
• the use of protected computer models and software that cannot be damaged by pre-created problems in their codes;
• development of electronic intelligence means;
• using social networks to deliberately influence the enemy with disinformation;
• protection of communication systems.

The second group of measures includes:

• protecting the psyche of troops from intentional psychological influence;
• correction of information transmitted by a potential enemy.

To develop and implement a set of these measures, it is necessary to create separate units operating in the field of information security.

Protection of military personnel from targeted psychological influence

Moral and psychological support for troops includes the use of a set of measures aimed at blocking measures used during a hybrid war. Today there are institutes and think tanks that have focused all their efforts on developing various ways to influence the moral and psychological state of troops. Within the framework of these studies, psychology, psychotronics, and the safety of psychoenergetic activity are studied.

The command of the Armed Forces intends to resist the targeted information and psychological impact in the following ways:

• conducting research on ways to target the psyche;
• using all available types of psychological work with military personnel,
• carrying out targeted protective measures.

All these measures are needed in order to create sustainable protection from information influence and the willingness of a serviceman to cut off information that bears signs of directed influence in order to destabilize his moral and psychological state. An enemy attack should not cause a decrease in the combat effectiveness of troops, their motivation, or suppression of will. Conducting educational work and organizing leisure time for troops will also be important.

Control over those military personnel whose area of ​​responsibility includes working with communications equipment, automated control systems, and information transmission becomes especially important. They are most likely to become targets for enemy development.

To control access to secret information, roles are differentiated. The head of the internal security service can limit the access of ordinary information security employees to certain functions of the system, for example, viewing reports.

Preventive measures

Assuming exactly what set of measures a potential enemy will use, it is necessary to use offensive means to block his capabilities. The following actions can be performed:

• deliberately misleading the enemy regarding the proposed measures and methods of combating threats to information security;
• destruction of communications and information systems;
• introducing intentional distortions into the operation of enemy information systems;
• identifying enemy support points operating on Russian territory and destroying them;
• obtaining confidential information about the enemy's intentions to reduce the level of security of troops and using this information to formulate defense strategies;
• the use of means of moral and psychological suppression of enemy information troops.

Information weapon

The development of information weapons is also considered as a separate area of ​​defense strategy. It should be designed not only to repel threats, but also to anticipate them. The enemy uses information weapons quite effectively, as can be seen in countries affected by military conflicts. Weapons are used not only in war zones, but also in those regions that are yet to become hotbeds of destabilization. Similar domestic weapons should show the same or greater level of effectiveness. The possibility of its use is not excluded in the near future.

Almost every army facility is now in the zone of possible destruction, so it is necessary to take a comprehensive approach to protecting its security. The state is steadily addressing these issues and increasing its protective potential. Developing your own software helps you avoid systemic risks that arose, for example, in Iran, when programs that were supposed to control air defense systems refused to function when hostilities began. They contained initially incorrect code.

Also, the Internet’s own data transmission channels should provide the possibility of communication in case of violation of the architecture of the World Wide Web.

Projection of tasks onto society

Additionally, it should be taken into account that measures to protect military information are not always applied when creating documentation on the basis of which military department data sets are created. Leaks can occur at the level of transport companies, scientific institutes, and service departments. Therefore, full security must be created at these stages. The lack of proper control over suppliers and contractors leads to the fact that troops are supplied with equipment that allows remote access by a potential enemy. The press has already written about such situations. In some cases, the use of such devices is prohibited by law, but not all of the army’s technical equipment has yet been modernized.

A serious vulnerability of army automated control systems also arises from the transfer of classified information over open communication lines, which civilian specialists sometimes allow themselves to do. This threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible.

Threats also arise when individuals disseminate accidentally acquired information on social networks. Such risks are blocked only by explanatory work with the population, since situations with the initiation of criminal cases under the article “High Treason” for a post on the Internet are not a worthy preventive measure.

An integrated approach to ensuring the information security of the Armed Forces and personnel should ensure the strengthening of Russia’s defense capability. Based on the Information Security Doctrine, it is possible to develop new comprehensive ways to combat growing threats.

Information security of a person and society: a textbook Petrov Sergey Viktorovich

3.2. Information support for defense activities and combat operations

According to the Doctrine, information security facilities in the field of defense relate:

information infrastructure of the central military command and control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and branches of the armed forces, associations, formations, military units and organizations that are part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, research institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

information resources of defense industry enterprises and research institutions fulfilling government defense orders or dealing with defense issues;

software and hardware for automated and automated control systems for troops and weapons, weapons and military equipment, equipped with information technology;

information resources, communication systems and information infrastructure of military branches, military formations and bodies.

To the number external threats information security in the field of defense The Doctrine refers to:

all types of intelligence activities of foreign states;

information and technical influences (including electronic warfare, penetration into computer networks) from potential adversaries;

sabotage and subversive activities of special services of foreign states, carried out by methods of information and psychological influence;

activities of foreign political, economic and military structures directed against the interests of the Russian Federation in the field of defense.

Internal threats Those that pose the greatest danger in this area are:

violation of the established regulations for the collection, processing, storage and transmission of information located at the headquarters and institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, at defense enterprises;

intentional actions, as well as errors of personnel of information and telecommunication systems for special purposes;

unreliable functioning of special-purpose information and telecommunication systems;

possible information and propaganda activities that undermine the prestige of the Russian Armed Forces and their combat readiness;

unresolved issues of protecting the intellectual property of defense enterprises, leading to the leakage of the most valuable government information resources abroad;

unresolved issues of social protection of military personnel and members of their families.

The listed internal threats will pose a particular danger in the context of an aggravation of the military-political situation.

Main directions improvement of the information security system in the field of defense are considered:

systematic identification of threats and their sources, structuring the goals of ensuring information security in the field of defense and identifying relevant practical tasks;

carrying out certification of general and special software, application packages and information security tools in existing and created automated control systems for military purposes and communication systems that incorporate elements of computer technology;

continuous improvement of means of protecting information from unauthorized access, development of secure communication systems and command and control of troops and weapons, increasing the reliability of special software;

improving the structure of functional bodies for ensuring information security in the field of defense and coordinating their interaction;

improving techniques and methods of strategic and operational camouflage, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, methods and means of actively countering information, propaganda and psychological operations of a potential enemy;

training of specialists in ensuring information security in the field of defense.

In the current geopolitical situation of Russia, when the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are faced with the problem of ensuring the military security of the country in conditions of sharply limiting the composition and capabilities of groupings of our troops, the use principles of the strategy of “indirect” actions, including its information component, becomes especially relevant.

The basis for achieving victory in military operations in the 21st century. Everything will increasingly be determined not by technical means, but by information. These changes stem from the content of the transition currently being carried out by humanity from a post-industrial society to an information society. Already today, when the emphasis is increasingly shifting from traditional approaches to armed struggle to the information and intellectual area, the theory and practice of Russian military art are faced with the need to develop and practically implement countermeasure system Western concept of “information warfare” and create their own system of offensive and defensive actions of a new type.

Information superiority will be the main component of the military strategy of this century, just as in the 20th century such components were air supremacy and the massive use of armored vehicles.

Among the factors determining the success of armed struggle, the most important has always been and remains human factor. Along with fire damage to personnel, it is increasingly planned to use information and psychological influence. The general tendency is to move from exterminating the enemy by means of conventional wars to attempts to demoralize him, to paralyze his activity, without physically destroying him. The impact of information weapons on a person is associated, first of all, with the disorganization of his consciousness and behavior, the suppression of the will to resist, a change in attitude towards the enemy and attitudes towards conducting combat operations.

To solve this problem the following can be used:

so called "soft" methods information defeat affecting human consciousness, in particular, propaganda, disinformation, suggestion, etc.;

so called "hard" methods information defeat, capable of disorganizing a warrior’s behavior at a deep, subconscious level. There are already known facts about the creation for these purposes of brain frequency coding generators, dowsing installations, high-frequency and low-frequency generators, chemical and biological agents.

In both cases, an attempt is made to realize the ancient ideal of the warring parties: to win without engaging in battle. At the same time, the need to switch to forceful achievement of the objectives of the operation is considered a strategic failure and its use is allowed only as a last resort.

The commander is the main link in the system of preparation and conduct of combat operations. Therefore, attempts to influence his emotional sphere, disorganize thinking and behavior will always be the most important task of information and psychological influence.

According to experts, such operations will begin ahead of time, even at the stage of developing plans for an armed conflict, and in its initial stages. Conventional military operations may not even be planned. Ideally, achieving the goals of confrontation should be achieved only by means of information warfare.

The full forces and means of information warfare can be used during combat operations themselves. In this case, the task of destroying combat control systems, information systems for receiving, storing and processing information of military and state significance, as well as moral and psychological suppression of the enemy will be solved.

Information warfare is a complex multi-tiered structure of actions and operations aimed simultaneously at solving offensive and defensive tasks. An approximate list of multidirectional efforts during the information confrontation is presented in Table. 3.1.

Table 3.1.

Information support for offensive and defensive actions

“We are approaching a stage of development when no one is a soldier anymore, but everyone is a participant in hostilities. The task now is not to destroy manpower, but to undermine the goals, views and worldview of the population, to destroy society” (from a speech by a representative of the Pentagon leadership).

According to military experts, in the defense sector the most vulnerable are considered:

information resources of the apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the main headquarters of branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, research institutions containing information on plans for preparing and conducting actions, on the composition and deployment of troops;

information resources of defense industry enterprises containing information about the volume of military equipment being created and its combat capabilities;

communication and control systems for troops and weapons, their information support;

moral and psychological state of the troops and population.

The informational and psychological influence of the enemy on the personnel of the army and navy will become significantly less effective if information support is provided in advance (and constantly) for the task associated with a real increase in the status of a person in uniform, creating a favorable image of military service and the Armed Forces in public perception. The insufficiency of such support in modern Russia significantly facilitates the work of our rivals in the information war.

With modern opportunities to convey information to the target information wars know no boundaries– neither spatial nor temporal. Advances in the technical equipment of media and communication, as well as in the methods of their application, now make it possible to influence almost every person and almost anywhere on Earth. Modern information warfare is a direct product of the globalization of the world. And it will be truly global in nature. The spheres of combat operations will include not only physical space (land, sea, air, space), but also information sphere, including, in particular, virtual space of the Internet, as well as social, psychological, ideological and spiritual spaces, within the framework of which the main defeat will be inflicted on the enemy. Unlike past wars, the concept of “theater of military operations” turns out to be very conditional.

The battlefield of the 21st century is the information sphere in which offensive and defensive operations unfold.

To the characteristic features global information war, which is often defined as the next “world war”, military experts include the following:

the war will be based, first of all, on the possibility of controlling and manipulating public consciousness, subordinating the will of man. The main target of impact will be people;

the main losses are expected not in the traditional, physical sense, but in the spiritual, psychological, political, and social. It is believed that such losses can, to a greater extent than physical ones, become decisive for the outcome of the war;

manipulation of mood and attitudes will play an important role population of the country as a whole, as well as the use of preparation technologies internal opposition in countries that are victims of aggression. What such processes can be was well demonstrated by the so-called “color” revolutions that swept through the countries of Eastern Europe and parts of Asia - with the support of the United States;

At the same time, active work will be carried out to undermine the authority of the state and its cooperation with other countries. This could also be seen in recent US actions (for example, in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, Belarus);

the role of “non-military” means of struggle and “indirect actions”, that is, actions in a non-contact manner, will increase;

The effectiveness of information weapons will be determined by the extent to which it affects the essential basis of a person, his will, morality, and mentality. And this defeat, in its consequences, will be more disastrous for man and humanity than a fire defeat;

Unlike all previous wars, the information war will be permanent, continuously expanding in time and space and, therefore, longer, stretching over many years and even decades.

As you know, information weapons have already been successfully tested in the Cold War of 1945–1991. And the world became convinced that non-military, non-traditional means, methods and methods of struggle are many times more effective than traditional military ones. The scale of demographic, territorial, political, economic, and psychological losses of the Soviet Union after defeat in this war turned out to be immeasurably greater and more difficult to repair than the damage to Germany and Japan, which lost World War II.

At present it is impossible to predict who will be the winner in a war where The main object of influence is the human psyche. And, most importantly, it is impossible to determine what the post-war psychological appearance of both the winners and the vanquished will be. It is likely that the strategic outcome of such a war will be a fundamentally deformed psyche of people. Consequently, today it is more important to think not about how to win the information war, but about how to stop it, how to impose a universal ban on information weapons as weapons of mass destruction.

However, while there is no such ban, it is necessary to at least take care of protection from information weapons, to ensure the information security of an individual, society, and state. During the Cold War 1945–1991. (in essence, already then mainly informational), the Soviet leadership - civilian and military - turned out to be unprepared for new forms of confrontation, different from the war of 1941-1945. As a result, the most powerful Soviet army in the world, without entering into battle, lost the war. History may repeat itself again, in another war, which, apparently, is already being waged by “non-obvious”, “non-hot” means. Are we preparing for the integrated use of modern forces and means (among which the main ones are information ones) or are we still relying only on the power of strategic missiles, tank armadas and mass armies? According to military experts, in the strategy of the Russian state, the concept of “war” is still viewed mainly through the prism of armed struggle between states. Therefore, the traditional ideas about war and peace that persist in the army, society, and government institutions can most likely play the same fatal role in the fate of post-Soviet Russia as in the fate of the USSR.

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