A conference on biological safety issues was held in Sochi (3408). International conference “Global threats to biological safety: problems and solutions Global threats to biological safety problems and solutions
The international conference “ Global threats biological safety: problems and solutions”, which was organized Federal service on supervision in the field of consumer rights protection and human well-being together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
The conference brought together more than 120 participants from 27 countries, international and public organizations, and representatives of the scientific community.
The Russian delegation was represented by the head of Rospotrebnadzor, the chief state sanitary doctor of the Russian Federation Anna Popova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov, as well as representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. The conference was attended by leading experts from foreign countries working in the field of biological safety.
The final plenary session of the Conference was dedicated to the future of the BTWC and the work program for 2018-2020.
The conference showed that the formation of global threats to biological security is influenced by many factors and the issues of countering these threats are becoming increasingly important in the modern world. The increasing number of cross-border travel, the growth of international trade, the development of biotechnology, regional conflicts, and terrorism exacerbate the risks of the emergence and global spread of dangerous pathogens, both as a result of natural processes and as a result of the deliberate spread of microorganisms and toxins.
In this regard, the conference noted that preventing and responding to threats to biological security of a natural and intentional nature require close multilateral cooperation, strengthening supranational mechanisms to curb the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, and developing international cooperation to provide assistance in the field of health risk management associated with infections.
In this context, Russian mobile anti-epidemic units have aroused particular interest as a tool for ensuring biological safety. In particular, the use of specialized anti-epidemic teams (SPEB) of Rospotrebnadzor and mobile complexes of the Russian Ministry of Defense for the analysis of pathogenic biological materials. SPEBs of Rospotrebnadzor of the newest generation and "Sych" of the RKhBZ troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense were presented at the exhibition for review.
During the Conference, the need for open, trusting and universal implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was repeatedly emphasized.
One of the fundamental mechanisms for effectively countering global threats to biological security, according to the conference participants, is the BTWC, which is essential for international peace and security. Reducing the level of such threats will be facilitated by the full compliance by states with all obligations accepted under the BTWC, both in terms of eliminating the possibility of using bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and in terms of promoting the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information on the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
Based on the results of the presentations and discussions, it can be noted that the priority global threats to biological safety today should be considered:
— unusual spread of known and emerging dangerous pathogens;
— unlawful use of microorganisms and toxins for military and terrorist purposes;
— uncontrolled biotechnological research related to the BTWC conducted by state and non-state actors;
— unlawful use of scientific and technical achievements in the field of biology;
— excessive integration of spheres international security and international health;
— attempts to “erode” the BTWC regime and create mechanisms for control over the development of biotechnologies, parallel to the BTWC;
— global imbalances in biotechnological development, reducing the collective capacity to prevent and respond to transboundary threats to biological security.
Participants noted that the program of intersessional work aimed at discussing priority tasks for the implementation of the BTWC and the development and implementation of practical mechanisms for implementing its articles makes a significant contribution to the strengthening and implementation of the Convention as a whole.
Taking into account the above, the conference participants expressed their commitment to the goal of strengthening the BTWC and, based on the decision of the VIII Review Conference of the BTWC (November 7-25, 2016), call on the BTWC States Parties during the annual meeting (December 4-8, 2017, Geneva) to take all efforts to make progress on substantive and process issues between now and the next IX Review Conference in order to reach consensus on the intersessional process.
In conclusion, the participants thanked the Russian Federation for organizing the Conference “Global Threats to Biological Security: Problems and Solutions” and emphasized the high organizational and substantive level of the forum in Sochi.
Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Among the wide range of biological threats, a special place is occupied by the danger associated with the use of pathogens of infectious diseases in humans, animals and plants as weapons. The consequences of such use can be catastrophic, and therefore biological weapons are justifiably classified as weapons of mass destruction.
In an effort to reduce the horrors of war associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction, the leading powers developed in 1925. However, this treaty did not impose restrictions or prohibitions on the development of biological weapons and only concerned their non-use in war between states parties to the Protocol. Almost immediately after its adoption, the obligations it contained were interpreted as not prohibiting retaliatory use, which contributed to the development of the doctrine of deterrence and the creation of appropriate arsenals for retaliatory strikes. The regime of the Geneva Protocol was not durable as a result of its open violation in the 1930s. due to the use of chemical weapons, and due to the non-participation in them over many decades of several militarily first-class powers. The Soviet Union acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1928. In 2001, Russia removed all reservations made by the USSR when joining the Protocol - we urge everyone else to do the same without further delay.
The events of World War II confirmed the need to improve the international legal regime to reduce the danger of the use of biological weapons. However, in the first twenty post-war years there were no conditions for this due to the fact that the leading states of the Western bloc carried out massive offensive biological programs. Moreover, they did it in a coordinated manner. By the end of the 1960s. there, however, they came to the conclusion that, in doctrinal terms, biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction duplicate nuclear weapons, and therefore, due to the expediency of economical spending of military budget funds, they can be abandoned. As a result, conditions for international negotiations were created. At that time, the Soviet Union put forward an initiative to develop a treaty banning both biological and chemical weapons. This proposal, supported by many developing countries, however, did not meet with approval in the West - they were in no hurry to give up the advantage they then had in the means of chemical warfare, especially the then new organic phosphorus toxic substances. Therefore, the scope of the negotiations that began in Geneva included only biological agents, as well as toxic waste products of living organisms - toxins. In 1971, at the last stage of negotiations, the text of the future Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons was agreed upon in a bilateral format between the two superpowers of that time - the USSR and the USA. The great intellectual contribution of Great Britain to the development of its text should also be noted. It is no coincidence that these three states were appointed depositaries of the BTWC, and their ratifications were determined as a condition for the treaty to enter into force, which took place in 1975.
The mechanisms for implementing the Convention largely reflect the realities of the international situation of that era, characterized by the confrontation between two different socio-political systems, known as the “Cold War”. Due to the confrontational mentality, it was impossible to provide procedures for verifying compliance with the new treaty and to create an organization to assist in the implementation of its provisions. However, the very fact of the appearance of such a Convention in a short period of detente can be considered a great success, since within a few years the “Cold War” as a paradigm of confrontation began to be promoted with renewed vigor, which until the second half of the 1980s. put an end to the prospects for concluding major agreements in the field of disarmament.
The first ten years of implementation of the BTWC confirmed the need to correct its inherent deficiencies. Taking advantage of the improvement in the international situation, the Soviet Union, at the Second Review Conference of the BTWC in 1986, first raised the issue of developing a control mechanism. However, other countries were not ready for this, and the opportunity to begin such work was missed. Who knows what the biological disarmament regime would look like now if the Soviet initiative had been accepted? History, however, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood. In 1991, the USSR, at the end of its existence, again supported the idea of developing a verification mechanism.
In 1992-1993 Already, the Russian delegation actively participated in the work of the VEREX group of government experts to consider verification issues from a scientific and technical point of view and contributed to the identification, formulation and evaluation of 21 potential verification measures and their various combinations.
Subsequently, in 1994, Russia, together with others, advocated the start of negotiations on the development of an additional legally binding protocol to the BTWC and actively participated in them for the next six years. Thus, there is a considerable Russian contribution to the draft Protocol, which was supposed to be approved at the Fifth Review Conference at the end of 2001. The breakdown in July 2001 of the negotiations that were nearing completion turned out to be for us, like many other states, a strong shock, a blow that launched under derailment of 10 years of multilateral diplomacy efforts. Then we did everything possible to save at least something and not allow the huge work done to be completely nullified. In particular, we, together with the sensible majority, managed to preserve the negotiating mandate of the Protocol and prevent its cancellation. It remains active and is awaiting a time when circumstances allow the efforts to be resumed. A survey conducted by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014, in which over 40 states took part, confirmed the continued interest of the majority in strengthening the BTWC by adopting an additional protocol to it.
At the same time, it should be noted that since 2001, the negotiation process within the BTWC has not been unblocked - the same political obstacles continue to exist with regard to the 1994 mandate. Old attempts to rewrite history continue with allegations that the BTWC is allegedly not verifiable, and work in this area is futile. Such statements are contrary to the conclusions of the VEREX group of experts, who, as I have already said, agreed in 1993 after two years of study that potential verification measures could be useful in terms of increasing transparency, promoting confidence that states are complying with their obligations under KBTO. Experts emphasized that, from a scientific and technical point of view, some verification measures would contribute to increased efficiency and improved implementation of the Convention and recognized that proper and effective verification could strengthen the BTWC. These are all evidence-based findings endorsed by broad consensus. Against this background, attempts by individual states, blocking the resumption of negotiations on the BTWC verification mechanism, to gain unilateral access to foreign microbiological facilities of interest to them, about which they never tire of spreading the most ridiculous rumors, look absurd. It is not clear why they need to inspect such facilities if they deny the possibility of verification under the BTWC. Probably, they still allow the added value of verification, but only in their own interests - the principle of reciprocity does not allow them to go by the belief in their own exclusivity and, perhaps, other reasons that they prefer not to talk about.
Russia, along with many states, believes that the most effective way to strengthen the Convention would be to adopt a legally binding protocol covering all its provisions, including verification. This is our constant long-term goal. At the same time, on at this stage We are ready to develop and adopt supporting measures and decisions that would help strengthen the BTWC regime in the near and medium term.
In this context, over the past few years, Russia has prepared and presented several promising initiatives related to improving the implementation of many provisions of the Convention.
Thus, in December 2015, together with Armenia, Belarus and China, we circulated a proposal to begin negotiations on the development of a legally binding document to improve the implementation of the BTWC, including the following areas:
Confidence-building measures;
National implementation;
Monitoring of scientific and technical achievements;
International cooperation for peaceful purposes;
Assistance and protection against biological weapons;
Investigation into the alleged use of biological weapons.
The proposal was of a compromise nature in an attempt to postpone the resolution of verification issues until the future, but in no way canceling or replacing the 1994 negotiating mandate. It aroused great interest among many countries, but the lack of adequate political will has not yet allowed it to move to its practical implementation.
In preparation for last year's Eighth Review Conference, Russia presented several initiatives and projects that have a practical orientation and undoubted added value in terms of creating specific mechanisms for implementing the provisions of the Convention.
First of all, it is necessary to note the initiative to create, under the auspices of the BTWC, mobile medical and biological units to provide assistance to the affected state in the event of the use of biological weapons, conduct an investigation of such use and assist in the fight against epidemics of various origins. Its implementation would make a major contribution to improving the implementation of three articles of the Convention: Article VII (assistance and protection against biological weapons), Article X (international cooperation in the prevention of disease) and Article VI (investigation of violations). Moreover, a synergistic effect and significant cost savings would be achieved, since mobile units, being multifunctional, could be used to solve a wide range of tasks.
If we talk about the positioning of mobile units in the strategy of comprehensively countering the threat of the use of biological agents as weapons, we were guided by the following considerations. Monitoring compliance with bans on the development and production of biological weapons requires verification activities, including the designation of relevant dual-use facilities and on-site visits. There is nothing new here - a similar approach is used by the IAEA and the OPCW. However, as a result of the breakdown of negotiations on the development of the Protocol in 2001, the parameters of such a control mechanism could not be agreed upon. Therefore, there is no objective data on compliance with these provisions of the Convention. This creates a situation of uncertainty and raises questions regarding real situation of things. Concerns in this regard are only intensified due to excessive amounts of funding for dual-use microbiological programs, dubious experiments with pathogens of deadly diseases (especially aerosol experiments), the build-up of military medical and biological activity outside the national territory and other risk factors. For these reasons, the threat of the use of biological weapons by both state and non-state actors cannot be discounted, especially since such use may be disguised as natural outbreaks of infectious diseases in humans, animals or plants. Based on this, it is necessary to have rapid response forces and means on hand that can quickly deal with the situation on the ground and take immediate action to stop the epidemic and its further elimination. If signs of deliberate spread of the disease are detected, an appropriate investigation should also be carried out to establish the facts and bring those responsible to justice. This is the logic of the Russian initiative for mobile biomedical units as a means of strengthening the BTWC and improving its implementation. Today we will hear more than once about the functionality and examples of the successful use of specialized rapid response units, both Russian and foreign. In our opinion, this is confirmation that our initiative is deeply thought-out, scientifically sound and in demand in practice.
No less important is the area of monitoring scientific and technological achievements related to the Convention. The purpose of such monitoring, on the one hand, is to identify and analyze the risks associated with certain areas of research and technology in order to reduce such risks to an acceptable level, without harming scientific and technological progress. On the other hand, it is necessary to raise awareness and widely disseminate knowledge and achievements that can help achieve the goals of the BTWC, primarily in the prevention of infectious diseases, regardless of the nature of their occurrence. In this regard, in 2016, Russia developed a proposal to create a representative Scientific Advisory Committee under the auspices of the Convention. Structures of this kind are widely used in international practice, and today in our program we will also have a report on an example of the successful functioning of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Council.
Another important question– this is an increase in the transparency of biological activities related to the BTWC. A particular risk factor in this regard is military biomedical activity carried out outside national territory. We note a significant expansion in the scope of such activities, which makes us think about its true direction and content. We speak about this first-hand, since we are increasingly noticing such manifestations in countries located near us. Last year, Russia presented on this topic detailed offer on improving confidence-building measures in the BTWC. We believe that such increased transparency will contribute to improved mutual understanding and contribute to the implementation of the goals of the Convention.
Dear Colleagues,
I have focused only on the most significant aspects of the Russian agenda to strengthen the Convention and improve its implementation. We are, of course, ready to consider and support proposals from other countries of a similar nature. We hope that taking into account each other’s interests and willingness to compromise will serve as a reliable basis for reaching an agreement on a new work program within the BTWC for the period 2018-2020, which should be adopted in a month at a meeting of the states parties in Geneva.
Thank you for your attention.
1. Conduct an international scientific and practical conference “Global threats to biological safety. Problems and solutions” (hereinafter referred to as the conference) on November 1-2, 2017 in Sochi.
2. Rospotrebnadzor organize the preparation and holding of the conference.
4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia to provide, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, assistance in ensuring the safety of citizens and public order in the venues of the conference and cultural and educational program events.
5. Rospotrebnadzor, together with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will ensure the invitation of foreign guests to participate in the conference.
6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia will ensure the issuance of visas in accordance with the established procedure at the request of Rospotrebnadzor to participants and guests of the conference, as well as representatives of the press, without charging fees for their issuance.
7. Financial support for expenses related to the organization and holding of the conference should be made within the budget allocations provided for by Rospotrebnadzor in the federal budget for 2017.
Document overview
On November 1-2, 2017, it was decided to hold an international scientific and practical conference “Global threats to biological safety. Problems and solutions” in Sochi.
Rospotrebnadzor is responsible for organizing and holding the conference.
On November 1-2, the International Conference “Global Threats to Biological Security: Problems and Solutions” was held in Sochi, organized by the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The conference was attended by 120 delegates from 27 countries, international and public organizations, and representatives of the scientific community. The Russian delegation was represented by the head of Rospotrebnadzor, the chief state sanitary doctor of the Russian Federation Anna Popova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov, as well as representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. Over the course of two days, conference participants discussed the current state of affairs in ensuring biological safety in the world in the context of the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Particular attention during the Conference was paid to the presentation of advanced developments in the prevention and emergency response to epidemic threats, demonstration of relevant equipment and technologies, and Russian experience in developing specialized international cooperation for peaceful purposes. The participants were greatly interested in reports on the use of mobile units in eliminating the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, including the experience of the People's Republic of China, the European mobile laboratory and Russian SPEB. Employees of RosNIPCHI “Microbe” took part in the conference.
Presentations were made by the director of the institute, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.V. Kutyrev and researcher at the epidemiology department A.S. Razdorsky.
The modernized mobile complex of the second generation Rospotrebnadzor SPEB was presented at the conference. It was visited by representatives of 14 countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Great Britain, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Portugal, Sweden, Tajikistan, Switzerland, Moldova). All those who visited the laboratories of the SPEB mobile complex of Rospotrebnadzor gave them a positive assessment.